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In 1994, Husayn Ali Qambar, a Kuwaiti S h ici, aban-
doned Islam and joined the Evangelical Church. The
news of his conversion caused quite a sensation in
Kuwait, as such an event is practically unheard of in
the Arabian Peninsula. Instead of keeping a low pro-
file, as is the custom amongst converts in the Middle
East, Qambar self-confidently stood up to the storm
of reactions. He agreed to meet with the press and
appeared in photos wearing a small silver cross
around his neck and holding a Bible in his hand. To
the question of why he had decided to become Chris-
tian, Qambar candidly answered ÔI have found God
e l s e w h e r e Õ .
Apostasy and
t h e L i b e r a l
P r e d i c a m e n t
to the association of liberalism with secular-
ism, politically expressed through the sepa-
ration of religion and state.
In the Kuwaiti context liberalism is primar-
ily understood in the latter sense. While
rights and liberties are also important, it is
not their embracement per se that makes a
Kuwaiti liberal. Rather, it is the embrace-
ment of the third tenet, the separation be-
tween d i n and d a w l a. As the term is used
here, a liberal is a person who looks upon re-
ligion as a personal matter and the public
sphere as a religiously neutral space. ÔLiber-
alÕ is therefore commonly used in opposi-
tion to ÔIslamistÕ, the latter term referring to
people for whom religion pervades and
shapes every aspect of social life. Every-
where in the Middle East these days, Is-
lamists and liberals differ in their views on
the relationship between religion, public
life and politics. Kuwait is no exception.
When it comes to apostasy, however, a
strong consensus can be found across the
liberal/Islamist divide. Most people reacted
with anger and dismay at QambarÕs conver-
sion; even local human rights activists per-
ceived it as an offence that called for some
form of punishment. While there were only
few demands for the death penalty, most
people accepted unquestioningly the im-
plementation of the civil sanctions.3
Protecting the significant
c o m m u n i t y
It may be tempting for Westerners to see
in the apostasy law yet another instance of
the incompatibility between the illiberal
Muslim East and the liberal West, or indeed
the ultimate vindication of the orientalist
ÔabsencesÕ thesis. To assess the situation in
such terms is to miss the point. What we are
dealing with here is not so much the clash
between liberal and illiberal cultures as a
political and ethical challenge common to
all modern societies: How can the political
community be protected against real or per-
ceived threats while infringing as little as
possible on basic individual rights? From
this perspective, the difference between
Muslim and Western societies lies in the de-
finition of the community under threat
rather than in the measures they evolve to
thwart this threat.
All communities Ð whether ethnically, reli-
giously or nationally defined Ð depend for
their existence on the allegiance of their
members; they are therefore keen to watch
their boundaries and the movements across
such boundaries. Not all large-scale com-
munities achieve the same degree of signif-
icance, nor are they all mutually exclusive.
To many in the Middle East, the most signif-
icant large-scale community is the u m m a.
Elsewhere, for example in Europe, it is the
nation-state. As a universal spiritual com-
munity, the u m m a throws its doors wide
open to incoming members but severely re-
stricts the right to exit. By contrast, nation-
states generally tend to be lenient on the
right to exit while keeping a particularly vig-
ilant eye on the admission of new members.
When confronted with acts construed as be-
trayal of the significant community, reac-
tions everywhere tend to be rather similar.
Thus nation-states deal with individuals
found guilty of treason by stripping them of
their freedom, and/or citizenship rights; in
case of high treason, they may even be sen-
tenced to death.
The politics of recognition
A further parallel can be drawn if we ap-
proach apostasy within the framework of the
politics of recognition. The most remarkable
feature of the case under study is not Qam-
barÕs conversion in itself, but the self-confi-
dence with which he faced his societyÕs criti-
cism. Qambar publicly defended his decision
by invoking the Kuwaiti constitution and the
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
From insights gained through interviews
with the convert, the conclusion can be
drawn that he sought to assert not only his
right to choose his own faith but also his
right to be accepted for who he is and be-
long in the Kuwaiti community on his own
terms. In other words, Qambar was seeking
not merely toleration but recognition.
Anyone familiar with developments in
Western societies within the past two to
three decades realizes that this is the same
demand that lies at the core of the multicul-
turalism debate, which is raging these days
on both sides of the Atlantic. In this debate,
which has split the liberal camp, more than
one Western liberal have rejected the cul-
tural minoritiesÕ right to difference on the
grounds that such recognition would frag-
ment the national community and under-
mine its value consensus. On the opposite
side, liberal defenders of minority groups do
not hesitate to assert the primacy of certain
collective rights at the expense of important
individual rights. For example, Charles Tay-
l o r4 has argued in favour of the Quebec lan-
guage legislation, which among other
things forbids French-speaking Quebecois
to send their children to English-language
schools. Although this law clearly infringes
on the parentsÕ freedom of choice, Taylor
finds it justifiable because it guarantees the
continued existence of the French-speaking
minority of Canada. Taylor and other West-
ern political philosophers question not only
the classical liberal tendency to defend indi-
vidual rights at all costs, but also the liberal
Kantian conception of justice that does not
presuppose any particular conception of
the good life. As Michael Sandel5 puts it:
ÔThe fundamental question is whether the
right is prior to the good.Õ I believe Sandel
articulates here the concern of the majority
of Kuwaiti liberals for whom rights may not,
or not always, be an end in themselves. The
reason that liberal informants could not
bring themselves to support QambarÕs free-
dom to convert may be seen as related to
their conviction that the virtue of rights lies
in the fact that they promote an end pre-
sumed to be good. Islam being in their eyes
the ultimate religion, they regard the apos-
tasy law, which prevents Muslims from mak-
ing the mistake of leaving the communityÕs
fold, as a good law. The end it promotes is
more important than the restrictions it
places on freedom of choice, which if exer-
cised may lead Muslims astray.
The implementation of the apostasy law
in several Middle Eastern countries is
viewed by human rights experts as a major
problem. In my opinion, the severity of the
law justifies both concern and criticism. It is
meanwhile important to bear in mind that
neither the rationale behind the law nor the
reluctance of Muslim liberals to put an end
to its implementation is unique and peculiar
to Islam or Muslim societies. Rather, it illus-
trates a predicament common to all political
communities. If we wish to argue against
the law, we should start from this common-
ality of dilemmas and concerns and not
from the rhetoric of difference between a
liberal (read: morally superior) West and an
illiberal Muslim world.
When it became clear that he would not
withdraw his decision, Qambar was sued for
apostasy. The case was tried in the S h ici
Court of First Instance, and in May 1996
Qambar was officially declared an apostate.
By then, he had already lost his family, his
home and his income. Qambar appealed
against the ruling, but shortly before the ap-
peal was to be reviewed, he was granted a
visa to the USA and was flown out of Kuwait.
I r t i d a d or conversion from Islam, also
known as apostasy, has always been a seri-
ous offence in the Middle East.1 A c c o r d i n g
to tradition, the apostate is to be executed;
pending execution, he/she is deprived of
the right to remain married to his/her Mus-
lim spouse, to retain guardianship over
his/her Muslim-born children and to inherit
or hold possessions. Within the personal
status laws of several Middle Eastern coun-
tries, these civil sanctions are codified and
spelled out explicitly. The apostasy law thus
strips the apostates of their most basic
r i g h t s .
The scientific literature on apostasy is lim-
ited. Discussions centre almost exclusively
on whether the death penalty is required by
the QurÕan. While of great scholarly interest,
they have no practical relevance since in
most Muslim countries today conversion is
no longer punishable by death. What re-
mains in force are the civil sanctions, which
violate several basic rights and freedoms.
Yet there is a perceptible reluctance in Mid-
dle Eastern societies, including within liber-
al circles, to discuss this form of punish-
ment. What are the reasons behind this re-
l u c t a n c e ?
Liberalism East and West
According to Bryan S.Turner,2 o r i e n t a l i s t s ,
in their attempt to imagine the Muslim
world as the radical Other of the West, de-
pict Islam as a Ôcluster of absencesÕ. Possibly
the deficiency most widely and persistently
associated with Islam in the Western imagi-
nation is the absence of liberal thinking.
Within the past two centuries, liberalism
has acquired a wide range of meanings, all
of which do not necessarily correspond to
the ideas of the doctrineÕs founding fathers.
Liberalism is increasingly understood as the
equivalent of democracy. Indeed, many
Westerners would argue that liberalism is
found only in the West, and they would dis-
agree with talk of liberalism in the Middle
East, let alone the Arabian Peninsula. A dis-
cussion of this view would have to be car-
ried out elsewhere. What is important to
point out here is that as a philosophical doc-
trine liberalism contains several basic
tenets, not all of which are equally focused
upon in practice. Different societies choose
to define liberalism by laying stress on one
or some particular tenet(s). Among the prin-
ciples that liberal thought characteristically
emphasizes are autonomy of choice, the pri-
macy of the individual over the collective,
and reason over faith. The first two tenets
have given rise to the centrality of individ-
ual rights and liberties; the third one has led
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